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CASE COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Electronic Eavesdropping and
The Right To Privacy
D was convicted of transmitting wagering information by telephone in interstate commerce in violation of federal law. Evidence
of D's side of these telephone conversations, obtained by federal
agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device
to the outside of the public telephone booth from which D had made
the calls, was introduced at the trial over D's objections. Held,
judgment reversed. The eavesdropping constituted a search and
seizure since it violated the privacy upon which D justifiably relied
when using the telephone booth and, therefore, a court order authorizing such eavesdropping was necessary. Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
This decision represents one of the advancing steps in the protection of what has been called "the right to privacy." The idea of
such a right first emerged in 1890 in a now-famous law review
article co-authored by Justice Brandeis.' Since that time this
right has been defined and protected in both criminal and civil
areas 2 and is recognized in the federal courts and in most state
courts.3

The concept of a "right to privacy" is derived from the fourth
amendment, which sets forth the requirements for searches and
seizures of the individual and his property by the government.4
From this it has been established that a search warrant is needed
to physically search and seize personal effects of an individual,' and
any conduct which circumvents this requirement is unconstitutional
I Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAV. L. REv. 193

(1890).
2

W. PRossER,

TORTS

829 (3d ed. 1964).

3 To the effect that West Virginia recognizes the right to privacy, see

Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 144 W. Va. 673, 110 S.E.2d 716 (1959); Roach
v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
5 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877). As to administrative searches,
see 70 W. VA. L. REv. 74 (1967).
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per se.6 A corollary to this requirement is the federal exclusionary
rule which excludes from federal courts any evidence obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment This exclusionary rule was
later extended and now applies to the states.8 The protection afforded by the fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule not only
extends to individuals but also to corporations and their officers.'
As to the individual, he is not only protected in his house,'" but

also in his office," store,' 2 hotel room,' 3 automobile,' 4 and taxi,'"

but apparently not in jail.'"
The requirement of a search warrant may be dispensed with
where the search is made incident to a lawful arrest,"' but the
search must be limited to the immediate area of the arrest.' 8 The
requirement may also be waived by the individual either expressly' 9
or impliedly.Y
The constitutionality of wiretapping was established in the 1928
case of Olmstead v. United States.2 ' In that case telephone wires
had been tapped in the basement of an office building and on a
public street. The Supreme Court held the evidence so obtained
admissible, reasoning that the fourth amendment did not prohibit
6 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Rios v. United States, 364
U.S. 253 (1960); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958); United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S.
20 (1925); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885).
7 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Paulsen, Safeguards in
the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U. L. REv. 65 (1957).
8 Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
9 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
'0 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
" Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
'2 Davies v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946).
'3 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
'4 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
'- Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
16 Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
'7 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483
(1964); Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S.
559 (1927).
18 Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964);
United States v. Jeffers, 342
U.S. 48 (1951); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). As to
police liability in unreasonable searches and seizures, see Note, 16 CLEV.MAn. L. REv. 428 (1967).
' Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
2 Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946).
21 277 U.S. 438 (1928). For the historical development of the law
since that time, see Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 1296 (1967); Sullivan, Wire-Tapping and Eavesdropping: A Review of the Current Law, 18 Hast. L. J. 59
(1966); Note, Eavesdropping Orders and the Fourth Amendment, 66 COLum.
L. REv. 355 (1966).
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23
hearing or sight. 2 Subseqently, Congress made wiretapping illegal.
With the advent of sophisticated electronic devices, it became apparent that one need not tap telephone wires in order to intercept
conversations. In Goldman v. United States24 agents applied a
"detectophone" to the wall of an adjoining room whereby they
were able to overhear petitioner's telephone conversations. The
Supreme Court held that this overhearing did not constitute "interception" of telephone messages prohibited by the statute.2" The
Court reasoned that no trespass had been committed in obtaining the
evidence so as to render the evidence inadmissible.2 6

The trespass test was to be used much by the Court in later
years. It was applied in 1961 in Silverman v. United States2" where
agents had used a "spike mike" which penetrated petitioner's wall
and contacted the heating ducts of his dwelling making the heating
system a sounding board. This was held to be an unauthorized
trespass thereby rendering the evidence so obtained inadmissible.
It was later held that a trespass, no matter how minute and insignificant, has this effect. 8
Newer electronic eavesdropping devices requiring no penetration
in order to accomplish their mission, plus the fact that the trespass
test failed in many instances, gave rise to a different concept of
protection - the constitutionally protected area theory. "9 Under
this theory whether evidence obtained by electronic eavesdropping is
in violation of the fourth amendment depends on whether the
individual is in a constitutionally protected area." In United States
v. Stone," a case very similar to the principal case, agents placed
an electronic transmitter under the base of a public telephone
whereby they were able to overhear defendant's side of the
conversation. The court held that the telephone booth was a
protected area, and thus the evidence was inadmissible. Where
For a com22 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928).
(1929).
ment on this case, see 35 W. VA. L. Q. 93U.S.C.
§ 605 (1964).
23 Communications Act of 1934, 47
24 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
25 Id. at 133. The statute referred to is the Communications Act of
1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964).
26 Id. at 135.
27 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
28 Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (thumb tack penetrating
into wall).
29 28 OHio ST. L. lEv. 527, 530 (1967).
30 Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
31 232 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Tex. 1964).
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the suspect is in a constitutionally protected area, it was later held
in Osborn v. United States32 that evidence obtained by eavesdropping
done pursuant to a court order is admissible. The Supreme Court
thus recognized that eavesdropping could be authorized. 3 The
question as to how authorized eavesdropping might be done was
left open.
Some states have statutes regulating wiretapping and electronic
eavesdropping, and many writers feel that it is at the state level
that regulation should be accomplished." Perhaps the most well
known of such statutes is that of New York. 5 Under this statute
a procedure is set forth like that contained in the fourth amendment.
On its face this seemed to be the best solution to the problem,
but the Supreme Court disagreed. In Berger v. New York,3 6 the
statute was invalidated as being unconstitutional. The Court set forth
four main reasons for invalidating the statute: (1) it contained no
provision for particularity as to the evidence to be obtained; (2) it
allowed a series of intrusions with only one showing of probable
cause; (3) it did not provide for a termination date once the
conversation had been seized; and (4) it permitted unconsented
entry without requiring a showing of special facts to justify the
elimination of consent."' By its decision, the Court held that
eavesdropping which is unconstitutional is not made valid by a court
order when the statute authorizing the order is too broad.3" Thus
Berger intimated a solution to the problem-a court order with
tight procedural safeguards. 9 Previous rules were put aside as well as
state statutes, and in place of them was left the skeleton of a new
32

385 U.S. 323 (1966).

The suggestion for authorizing eavesdropping by warrant appears to
have been first made by Justice Brennan in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
34 Runft, The Electronic Bavesdropping Threat to the Right of Privacy:
Can the States Help?, 3 IDAHO L. Rlv. 13 (1966); Sullivan, Wire-Tapping
and Eavesdropping: A Review of the Current Law, 18 HAST. L. J. 59 (1966);
Note, Electronic Surveillance and the Right of Privacy, 27 MONT. L. REv.
173 (1966).
31 N.Y. CODE CRnm. PRoc. § 813-a (McKinney 1958). In pertinent part:
3"

An ex parte order for eavesdropping . . . may be issued by any
justice of the supreme court . . . upon oath or affirmation . . . that there

is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may be thus
obtained, and particularly describing the person or persons whose communications ... are to be overheard or recorded and the purpose thereof.
36
37
38

388 U.S. 41 (1967).
Id.

Greenwalt, Wiretapping and Bugging: Striking a Balance Between
Privacy and Law Enforcement, 72 CASE & CoM. 3, 6 (Sept.-Oct. 1967).
39 Id.
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constitutional rule much like that of the fourth amendment, only
more narrowly defined.4"
The logical conclusion to the reasoning set forth in Berger is
embodied in the principal case. For the first time since 1928 and
Olmstead a workable rule has been established which appears to
provide adequate protection of the individual's fourth amendment
rights in the area of electronic eavesdropping." The Katz rule is
that a court order, such as that in Osborn, may be used if the officers
wishing to obtain eavesdrop evidence " . . . present their estimate
of probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate."42
Then, while conducting their search, they must "... . observe precise
limits established in advance by [the] specific court order."43
Finally, after such a search, they must " . .. notify the authorizing
magistrate in detail of all that [has] been seized." 44
By the operation of this rule, the suspect's fourth amendment
rights are protected by the neutral magistrate and the strict court
order. In addition, the rule does not require notice of the intended
eavesdropping to the suspect, since such notification would largely
destroy the possibility of obtaining the evidence. This principle
has been recognized in the area of conventional search warrants.4"
In arriving at its decision, the majority in the principal case
discarded the "trespass" and "constitutionally protected area"
formulations reasoning that ". . . the fourth amendment protects
people, not places." 46 The important distinction to be made is that
it matters not where a person is at a particular time, but only whether
he wishes to preserve his activity as private. This is not to say
that a person is protected if he exposes this activity to the public;48
he must take steps to preserve it as private. In the principal case
petitioner made his calls from a telephone booth to exclude the
40 The decision had narrowed
the scope of the court order which was
upheld in Osbom v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
41 The Court in the principal case discounts the idea of a general constitutional "right to privacy" under the fourth amendment. Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
42 Id. at 356.
43 Id. at 356. The Court conceded that the surveillance as conducted
was limited enough to have been permitted by court order. Id. at 354.
44 Id. at 356.
4' Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
46 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
47 Id.
48 Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
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"uninvited ear," not the "intruding eye."' 49 He wished to keep what
he said private, and was justified in assuming that this would be the
case.5 Therefore, he was entitled to the protection afforded by the
fourth amendment-freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures."
A question left open in this case, and one which may prove to be
important later, is raised in the Court's footnote 23. In this footnote
the Court observed that the present decision was not concerned with
eavesdropping in cases involving national security. In a concurring
opinion,5 2 Justice White expressed the view that the warrant
procedure should be dispensed with in cases of national security if
eavesdropping is authorized by the President or Attorney General,
stating for his only reason that successive presidents have
authorized such surveillance to protect the security of the nation.53
In rebuttal to this, Justice Douglas in a concurring opinion," in
which he was joined by Justice Brennan, raised the point that the
President and Attorney General, because of their positions, are
not detached from the problem of national security, and thus do not
qualify as neutral magistrates. The fourth amendment draws no
distinction between substantive offenses, and, therefore, none
should be drawn here.55 The point is well taken, and the argument
convincing, and may prove to be the better view. At a time when
international espionage is an acute problem, the question left open
by the Katz case may call for an early answer.
John Charles Lobert

Constitutional Law-Group Legal ServicesUnauthorized Practice of Law
The Illinois State Bar Association sought to have a labor union
enjoin from the practice of employing licensed attorneys on a
salary basis to prosecute workmen's compensation claims for any
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
50 Id. at 352.
49

51 Id. at 359.

Id. at 362
Id. at 364
14 Id. at 359
55 Id. at 360
52

53

(concurring
(concurring
(concurring
(concurring

opinion).
opinion).
opinion).
opinion).
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